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CASENOTES
Federal Regulation of Intra-Family Deprogramming Conspiracies Under
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Ward v. Connor.' — In the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, 2 the Forty-Second Congress provided statutory protection for the vic-
tims of conspiratorial terrorist acts perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan and
similar organizations. 3 A portion of the Act of 1871 — hereinafter referred to as
section 1985(3)4 — provides a cause of action for victims of conspiracies in
which no state involvement is present. 5 In its only construction of section
1985(3), the Supreme Court of the United States held in Griffin v. Breckenridge
that the statute afforded a cause of action to the victims of a racially motivated
conspiratorial assault and battery.' Recently, in Ward v. Connor, 8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit extended the coverage of section
1985(3) to permit a member of a religious group who was kidnapped and sub-
' 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982).
An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, and for other Purposes, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified in part at 42
U.S.C. 55 1983, -85, -86 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
3 Id. The legislation was enacted in response to a special message sent to Congress by
President Ulysses S. Grant urging legislation to deal with the rising tide of terrorism in the
southern states led by the Ku Klux Klan. 1B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 591-93 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS].
Although the Klan was the largest such group, it was not the only terrorist organization operating
in the Reconstruction South. Other similar groups present during the period included the
Knights of the White Camelia, the '76 Association, the Pale Faces, the Knights of the Rising
Sun, and the White Brotherhood, as well as local insurrectionary bands affiliated to a greater or
lesser degree with the Ku Klux Klan. See K. STAMP'', THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 199
(1965); A. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN
RECONSTRUCTION 49-51 (1971).
4 42 U.S.C. 5 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979). The section states, in pertinent part:
If two or more persons ... conspire . for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws ... [and] do, or cause
to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such in-
jury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Id. The section was previously designated as 42 U.S.C. I 1985(c)(1976) and 8 U.S.C.
47(3)(1946). For the remainder of this casenote, however, the statute will be referred to as
1985(3), notwithstanding its designation at the time of the cases discussed.
Id. Thus, this section is distinguishable from 42 U.S.C. 1 1983 which prohibits
deprivations of constitutional rights only by persons acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.
1 1983 (Supp. [II 1979).
6 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
Id. at 101.
a 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982).
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jected to "deprograming" 9
 by his family and others to maintain a cause of ac-
tion under the statute.'°
The plaintiff in Ward was a twenty-eight-year-old white, male member of
the Unification Church." The defendants were his closest relatives and certain
other persons acting in concert with them.' 2 The plaintiff alleged that as he
prepared to return to New York following a Thanksgiving visit with his sister in
Virginia, he was kidnapped by the defendants and held captive for 35 days."
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to kidnap him and force him
to renounce his religious beliefs." The plaintiff also alleged that during his im-
prisonment he was subjected to physical and verbal abuse by his captors in
their vain attempt to deprogram him of his devotion to the Reverend Sun
Myung Moon. 15
The plaintiff sued the defendants in the federal district court for eastern
Virginia under section 1985(3) and seven state law tort claims." The defend-
ants moved to dismiss the federal claim on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to allege facts giving rise to a cause of action under federal law." The
district court dismissed the plaintiff's section 1985(3) claim pursuant to that
motion.]' The court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that a right
9 "Deprogramming" in this context has been described as the abduction and confine-
ment of a person to apply intense emotional, and sometimes physical pressure to force the renun-
ciation of religious beliefs. Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Commen-
tators, however, disagree on the character of the act. Compare LeMoult, Deprogramming Members of
Religious Sects, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 599 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LeMoult] (terming it a
modern form of religious persecution analogous to crucifixion, torture and burning at the stake)
with Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 78 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Delgado] (terming it a form of marathon encounter
therapy to neutralize the effects of cult conditioning, and a self-help device for parents of "cult
youth").
'° 657 F.2d at 48.
" Brief for Respondent at 2a-3a, Mandelkorn v. Ward, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982). The
Unification Church is an international religious organization. Id.
" Id. at 3a-8a. Of the 33 conspirators named in the plaintiff's complaint, at least ten
were relatives of the plaintiff. Id. at 3a-7a. They included the plaintiff's mother, father, two
sisters, a brother, three uncles and two aunts. Id.
15 Id. at 20a.
" Id, at 9a. The complaint also alleged that the conspirators' purposes were to prevent
him from freely associating with other members of the Unification Church, to hinder his in-
terstate travel and to prevent him from discussing and exercising his religious beliefs. Id.
15 Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp. 434, 435 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev 'd 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982).
15 Id. at 435-436. The plaintiff's state law claims were for statutory conspiracy, assault,
battery, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional harm and
grand larceny. Id. at 436. Not all of the 33 defendants named in the federal claim were included
in the state claim suits. Id. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief against his ten relatives and one
non-family defendant, and punitive and compensatory damages from all other non-family
defendants named to the suit. Brief for Respondent at 20a-30a, Mandelkorn v. Ward, 102 S. Ct.
1253 (1982).
" 495 F. Supp. at 436.
15 Id. at 438. Diversity jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state claims was retained by the
district court. Id.
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securable by the national government against private deprivations had been in-
fringed, and, in addition, had failed to allege facts tending to demonstrate the
requisite elements of section 1985(3) action. 19
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court. 2° The appeals court held that the allegation that one of the conspiracy's
purposes was to prevent the plaintiff's intended interstate travel was sufficient
to establish congressional authority to reach the private act of discrimination
alleged . 21 The court also held that the statute reaches religious
discrimination, 22
 and that although the defendants may have been motivated
in part by their concern for the plaintiff rather than by their hatred for
members of the Unification Church as a class, the cause of action was not
defeated." Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiff a cause of action under
section 1985(3). 24
This casenote examines the Fourth Circuit's holding in Ward v. Connor in
light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1985(3) in Grifitiri v.
Breckenridge." First, the history of section 1985(3) will be discussed, including
the statute's early application to private acts of discrimination. The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the section in Griffin will then be considered. Next,
Griffin's two-prong analysis of section 1985(3) claims will be juxtaposed against
both the district court's and the court of appeals' decision in Ward. The
casenote then turns to an analysis of the Fourth Circuit's decision. Specifically,
the court's ruling that Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate the
challenged private activity will be considered. Next, the court's extension of
the scope of section 1985(3) to include discrimination against religious groups
will be examined. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of Griffin's re-
quirement that a class-directed bias motivate private conspiracies subject to
section 1985(3) will be scrutinized. It will be submitted that while the Ward
court was justified in extending the protection of section 1985(3) to religious
groups, its treatment of Griffin's bias requirement fails to comport with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1985(3), and with the statute's
legislative history.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF WARD V. CONNOR
Section 1985(3) is the codification of a portion of section two of chapter
twenty-two of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 26
 Popularly known as the "Ku
15 Id. See text and notes at notes 72-90 infra.
2° 657 F.2d at 49.
2 Id. at 48.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 49.
24 Id.
25 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
26
 Compare An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States, and for other Purposes, ch. 22 5 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) with 42
U.S.C. S 1985(3) (Supp. [II 1979). The original language of that portion of the Act of 1871 has
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Klux Klan Act," 27
 the Act was the congressional response to violent and brutal
acts committed by bands of hooded marauders who terrorized the South during
the Reconstruction era. 29 The legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act is rife
with tales of murder, beatings and other acts of terrorism carried out by the
Klan and similar organizations during the postbellum period. 29 The Act of
1871" embodied a congressional intent to provide a private cause of action to
victims of such terrorist acts. 3 ' The portion of the Act which manifested this
congressional purpose, subsequently codified as section 1985(3), imposes four
distinct requirements on parties suing under the statute: first, there must be
conspiracy; second, the purpose of the conspiracy must be to deprive either
directly or indirectly equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and im-
munities thereunder; third, there must be an act in furtherance of the con-
spiracy; finally, there must be either an actual injury incurred, or an actual
deprivation of a right." The statute as originally introduced in Congress was to
reach all conspiratorial deprivations of rights." The enormous sweep of the
original language led to pressures for amendment, which resulted in the nar-
survived virtually unchanged in the terms of § 1985(3).
27 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 426 (1973).
28 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 227 (1871) (resolution by Sen. Sherman):
That as organized bands of lawless and desperate men 	 bound by secret oaths
.. have, by force, terror, and violence ... overthrown the safety of person and
property, and the rights which ... are guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States ... the Judiciary Committee is instructed to report a bill or bills to
enable the federal government to punish and prevent such organized violence, and
secure to all citizens the rights so guaranteed.
Id. See also remarks of Sen. Chandler: "Thousands and tens of thousands are being taken out and
whipped and scourged every day by the Klan. The question to be settled here is, can we stop
these outrages or can we not?" Id. at 271. See also SCHWARTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at
591
28 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 33 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Scott).
To highlight the need for national legislation to curtail the activities of the Klan, Senator Scott
detailed the Klan's midnight whipping of a Negro preacher named Corliss; its whipping and
shooting of Caswell Holt, a Negro male; the Klan's whipping of a white Republican named
Ramsour; and the Klan's assault on a white federal revenue officer named C.D. Upchurch. Id.
See also id. at 155-59 (remarks of Sen. Sherman). Addressing the Senate debates over the Act of
1871, Senator Sherman pointed to testimony before the Select Committee on Outrages in
southern States as evidence of the need for federal legislation. Id. The senator cited testimony by
four witnesses to atrocities perpetrated by the Klan: Judge Settle of North Carolina testified to
the Klan's whipping of a 70-year-old Negro man and his two daughters; Judge Pryor of Ken-
tucky testified to the cold-blooded murder of United States Army Captain Joseph G. Crane by
Klan thugs; Peter R. Harden testified to the Klan's midnight lynching of Wyatt Outlaw, a Negro
male, and the Klan's subsequent drowning of a retarded Negro male who witnessed the lyn-
ching; Robert W. Logan testified to the enormous number of "whippings, shootings and burn-
ings" by these terrorist groups. Id. Senator Sherman added that neither indictments nor convic-
tion for these crimes could be gained due to the Klan's interference with state judicial processes.
Id. at 157-59, 165-66.
" See note 2 supra.
" Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 662 (1951).
32 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)(Supp. III 1979), construed in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 102-03 (1971).
" Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 99-100, citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. at 478 and app. 68, 69, 188 (1871).
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rowing of the scope of the law of. deprivations attacking equality of rights. 34
Thus, conspiracies engaged in to deny equality before the law which caused in-
jury or the deprivation of rights were to be actionable under this portion of the
Act of 1871. 35
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Harris36 that
the state must be a participant in any conspiracy to discriminate subject to
federal proscription," the forerunners of section 1985(3) went largely unused
for 100 years." The issue in Harris was whether the criminal analogue to sec-
tion 1985(3)," which was being used to prosecute conspirators to a murder,
could be applied under the Constitution to purely private actors." The Court
held that the Constitution does not empower Congress to reach private
discriminatory acts, and thus struck down the criminal statute." The Harris
" 403 U.S. at 100.
" The language of the Act and its title reflect an apparent intent of the Forty-Second
Congress to employ the fourteenth amendment to reach the terrorist acts of the Klan and its
brother organizations. Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 331 (1967). It has been frequently declared,
however, that the Act of 1871 was passed to implement all three Civil War amendments — the
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. See Byrd v. Sexton, 277 F.2d 418, 426 (8th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 818 (1960); Bomar v. Bogart, 159 F.2d 338, 339-40 (2d Cir. 1947);
Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651, 657 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 316 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963). For
a more detailed survey of the intent of the framers of the section, see Comment, A Construction of
Section I985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 402, 407-20 (1979).
36 107 U.S. 629 (1882).
" Id. at 639.
38 There were no reported cases of suits under 5 1985(3) prior to 1920. See Note, The
Scope of Section 1985(3) Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 239, 240 n.4
(1977); Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy? 26 IND L.J.
361, 363 (1951). The Supreme Court considered suits under the section (formerly codified at 8
U.S.0 5 47(3)) on only three occasions in the 80 years after its enactment. See Tenney v. Brand-
hove, 341 U.S. 367, 369-72 (1951); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 5-13 (1944); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 506 & n.4 (1939).
" The criminal analogue to 5 1985(3) which was involved in Harris provided:
If two or more persons ... conspire ... for the purpose, either directly or in-
directly, of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws ... each and every
person so offending shall be . . . punished by a fine ... or by imprisonment ... or
by both such fine and imprisonment....
An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and for other Purposes, ch. 22 5 2, 17 Stat. 13-14 (1871) codified at 70 Rev. Stat. ch. 7
5 5519, repealed, 35 Stat. 1154 (1909), reenacted and codified with some differences in language at 18
U.S.C. 5 241 (1976). The then-existing statute, as construed by the Court in Harris, is found in
106 U.S. at 632.
40 106 U.S. at 636.
4 ' Id. at 644. In Han-is, the Court considered the constitutionality of the criminal
counterpart to 5 1985(3) (see note 39 supra) under the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments, and the privileges and immunities clause of article 4, section 2 of the Constitution. Id. at
636-44. The Harris Court concluded that congressional authority to enact the statute was not
vested by any of these provisions. Id. at 644. The Court noted that fifteenth amendment rights
were not involved. Id. at 637. The Court declared that the statute's language was too broad to fit
within the thirteenth amendment. Id. at 640-41. Finally, the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment and the privileges and immunities clause only protect against action by state govern-
ments. Id. at 637-39, 643-44. Having determined that Congress was without authority to enact
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Court's holding raised grave doubts as to section 1985(3)'s constitutionality."
The doubts over section 1985(3)'s constitutionality were resolved tem-
porarily by the Supreme Court's decision in Collins v. Hardyman. 43
 The issue in
Collins was whether, under the equal protection language of section 1985(3) ,44
the plaintiffs could claim the statute's protection absent any involvement by
state authorities in the alleged discriminatory conspiracy." The Collins Court
held that to state a claim under the section, a plaintiff must allege a conspiracy
to manipulate or influence a state's ability to afford equal protection to its
citizens." Failure to allege such an effect on state officials' actions would defeat
the cause of action. 47
 The Court's holding in Collins was subsequently con-
strued to require traditional state action in the discriminatory deprivation of
rights."
Twenty years after the Collins decision, the Court reconsidered the con-
struction of section 1985(3) in Griffin v. Breckenridge." Griffin involved a racially
motivated beating." The plaintiffs in Griffin were black citizens of the United
States and residents of Kemper County, 5 ' Mississippi. 52
 The defendants were
the statute, the Harris Court declared S 1985(3)'s criminal analogue unconstitutional. Id. at 644.
42
 See, e.g., M. KONVITZ, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 101-03 (1947).
43
 341 U.S. 651 (1951). Collins involved a "lawless political brawl, precipitated by a
handful of white citizens against other white citizens." Id. at 662. The plaintiffs in Collins were
members of a group opposed to the Marshall Plan. Id. at 653. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants, motivated by their disagreement with the plaintiff's views, conspired to disrupt a
political meeting of those opposed to the Plan. Id. at 653-54.
44
 The equal protection language present in 5 1985(3) as referred to in Collins is: " 'for
the purpose of depriving . . . of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws. ' " Id. at 660 (emphasis supplied by the Court). This language parallels the terms of sec-
tion one of the fourteenth amendment. See note 117 infra. Significantly, the Collins Court
restricted its analysis to the interpretation of the section's language, and concluded that the
statute by its own terms required interference with a state official's ability to protect the plaintiff's
rights. Id. at 661. Therefore, unlike the Court in United States v. Hams, the Collins Court did not
reach the constitutional question of whether the fourteenth amendment or any other constitu-
tional power would authorize congressional regulation of private acts of discrimination through
5 1985(3). Id. at 662. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 636 (1882). See text and note at
note 41 supra.
4' 341 U.S. at 656.
46 Id. at 661. By interpreting the language of S 1985(3) to require state involvement in
the alleged conspiracy, the Collins Court was thus able to contain the statute within the ambit of
the fourteenth amendment's authority. Id. at 659.
47 Id. at 661.
48 Collins did not explicitly require that conspirators be operating under color of state
law to be within the ambit of the section. Rather, the Court suggested that a conspiracy to in-
fluence a state official's ability to provide equal protection would be actionable under S 1985(3).
Id. at 661. Lower courts, however, subsequently treated Collins as requiring traditional state ac-
tion. See, e.g., Wallach v. Cannon, 357 F,2d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 1966); Huey v. Barloga, 277 F.
Supp. 864, 869 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Bryant v. Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 681, 688 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
43 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
20
 Id. at 89-91.
21
 Kemper County is located on Mississippi's border with Alabama. Id. at 106.
32 Id. at 89.
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white, United States citizens and were also residents of Kemper County." The
plaintiffs alleged that on July 2, 1966, the defendants stopped the plaintiffs'
automobile on a highway, near the Mississippi-Alabama border, and, while
holding them at gunpoint, brutally beat the plaintiffs with blackjacks." The
plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants were acting under the mistaken belief
that the plaintiffs were civil rights workers." The issue presented in Griffin was
whether the plaintiffs could state a cause of action under section 1985(3) where
the complaint alleged no involvement by state officials." The Court recognized
that the allegations presented approached the paradigm for the acts proscribed
by Congress in section 1985(3). 5 ' The Court held that section 1985(3) does
reach private actors, and that the plaintiffs did state a cause of action under the
section." The Griffin Court's holding signaled the end to the state action re-
quirement for suits brought under the section . 59
53 Id. at 90.
" Id. at 90-91.
" Id.. at 90.
56 Id. at 92-93.
" Id. at 103. "Indeed, the conduct here alleged lies so close to the core of the coverage
intended by Congress that it is hard to conceive of wholly private conduct that would come within
the statute if this did not." Id.
58 Id, at 103-07. The Griffin Court recognized the problem posed by the statutory
language requiring a denial of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities. Id. at 96-97.
The Court noted that a denial of equal protection by private actors was difficult to conceptualize
in light of prior fourteenth amendment litigation in which the focus was upon state action re-
quirements. Id. at 97. The Court determined, however, that nothing in the language of 5 1985(3)
by its own terms required the presence of state action. Id. The Court then looked to the compan-
ion statutes to 5 1985(3). Id, at 98-99. The Court noted that each companion section provided a
remedy for a particular form of state action, id, , and taken together those sections covered all of
the apparent forms of state involvement possible in deprivations of equal protection. Id. at 98-99.
The Court concluded that inclusion of a state action requirement to trigger the statutory protec-
tion in 5 1985(3) would have been redundant. Id. at 99. Hence, the Court concluded that state
action need not be shown to state a cause of action under 5 1985(3). Id. at 101. The Court rein-
forced its determination that 5 1985(3) reaches private acts of discrimination by reviewing the
section's legislative history. Id. at 99-101. Comments made during the debates over the bill which
showed the intent of some legislators to reach private discrimination weighed heavily in the
Court's survey of the legislative history. Id, The Court also relied on Congress' preoccupation
with the type of animus required to bring the section into play as evidence of the drafters'
assumption that the section's coverage was to include private acts of discrimination. Id. at 100.
The Court concluded that "[i]t is thus evident that all indicators — text, companion provisions,
and legislative history — point unwaveringly to 1985(3)'s coverage of private conspiracies." Id.
at 101
59 Id. at 104. Griffin did not expressly overrule the Collins decision. Id. at 95. The Griffin
Court noted that Collins' strict interpretation of the equal protection language of the section was
influenced by the constitutional problems raised by allowing it to reach beyond state action into
the realm of private conduct. Id. at 94. These constitutional concerns were exacerbated in Collins
by the severability rule then in use which mandated the invalidation of an entire statute if any
portion was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 104. Thus, under the severability rule, the
statute in question would be declared unconstitutional if any possible application would be
beyond the scope of Congress' authority. Id., citing Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 685 (1887).
The Court in Griffin noted that the severability rule had been "long since firmly rejected," 403
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Having determined that section 1985(3) was meant to reach private
discriminators, the Griffin Court was left to construe the limits on the section's
applicability. Turning to this task, the Court adopted a two-step analysis to
determine whether a cause of action in within the scope of section 1985(3).
First, the case must be within the constitutional ambit of a specific congres-
sional power to reach private actors. q The Court found that congressional
authority to reach the private acts of discrimination in Griffin was rooted in two
constitutional sources: the thirteenth amendment and the right to interstate
travel." Second, the alleged conduct must fall within the statutory re-
quirements of section 1985(3). 52 Turning to the second step of its analysis, the
Court recognized the ambiguity of the section's requirement that the con-
spirators be motivated by an intent to deny equal protection or equal privileges
and immunities." The Court therefore imposed a "gloss" on the section's
language by interpreting the requirement to mean that conspiracies motivated
by an "invidiously discriminatory class-based animus" would be actionable."
In the eleven years since the Griffin decision, the Court has not had occasion to
reconsider its construction of section 1985(3). 65 Consequently, the two-step
analysis suggested by the Griffin opinion must be employed to test the ap-
plicability of the section to the facts of a given case.
U.S. at 104, citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-24 (1960), and concluded that "it is
clear, in the light of the evolution of decisional law in the years since [Collins] was decided, that
many of the constitutional problems there perceived simply do not exist." 403 U.S. at 95-96. The
Griffin Court, however, did not entirely rid the section of its state action requirement. The Court
limited the reach of the section to private conspiracies motivated by "class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus." Id, at 102. See text and notes at notes 118-21 infra. By leaving the Col-
lins decision undisturbed, therefore, the Griffin Court implicitly left the state action requirement
in place for conspiracies not motivated by class bias.
66 403 U.S. at 104. In holding that 5 1985(3) covered private acts of discrimination, the
Griffin. Court thus brought into issue whether the fourteenth amendment — which had been held
only to reach state action — could be relied upon as constitutional authority for the statute. Id. at
94-96. See text and notes at notes 36-48 supra. The Court, however, expressly reserved the ques-
tion of the scope of the fourteenth amendment's authority over private conduct, id. at 107, and
instead relied on other constitutional grounds for 5 1985(3)'s extension. Id. at 104-06.
61 Id. See text and notes at notes 102-06 infra. The Court added that in identifying these
two sources, it was not precluding the possible use of alternative bases for congressional interven-
tion into private conduct. Id. at 107. In Griffin, the Court treated the constitutional portion of its
analysis only after determining that the statutory requirements were satisfied. For this casenote's
treatment of Ward, the order of the Griffin analysis has been reversed to demonstrate better the
constraints present in construing the section's language.
62 Id. at 102-03.
63 Id. at 97.
" Id. at 102. See text and notes at notes 117-23 infra. It would appear that conspiracies
which both fulfill the statutory requirements and Griffin 's gloss, and infringe a right securable by
Congress from private deprivations, are thus protectable under 5 1985(3).
65 The Court has considered, however, at least one case under 5 1985(3) since Griffin.
Nevertheless, in Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), the Court
did not reach the question of statutory construction. Rather, the Court in Novotny was presented
with the question of whether sex discrimination in violation of 5 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a)(1976), constituted a denial of "the equal protection, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws" within the meaning of 1985(3). 442 U.S. at
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II. THE HOLDINGS IN WARD V. CONNOR
While the two-step analysis promulgated by the Griffin Court for testing
actions brought under section 1985(3) is reasonably straightforward, its ap-
plication has not been wholly consistent. Lower courts have reached widely
divergent results on both the constitutional requirements, 66 and the statutory
prerequisites 67 that the Griffin analysis mandated. This lack of consensus was
reflected in Ward v. Connor. Both the district and appellate courts in Ward
recognized the Griffin test as controlling for suits under section 1985(3). 68
Disparate conclusions were reached, however, as a result of variations in the
two courts' constructions of Griffin's holding. The Griffin Court cited certain
important, and potentially conflicting, considerations as constraints on its con-
struction of section 1985(3). Specifically, the court expressed its desire to give
the statute "a sweep as broad as its language," 69 while at the same time to pre-
vent the statute from creating a general federal tort law." The difference in
significance accorded these two constraining considerations produced the con-
flicting results in the two Ward decisions. The remainder of this casenote will
consider the divergent constructions of Griffin given by the two courts in Ward,
and propose guiding principles to determine the section's applicability to future
cases. While the casenote will devote some attention to the constitutional re-
quirement of Griffin's two-part analysis, the discussion will focus primarily on
the statutory construction of section 1985(3) — specifically, the class-based
animus gloss read into the section by Griffin."' In conclusion, the casenote will
propose guiding principles that will be true to both the statutory language and
to the constraining considerations expressed by the Griffin Court in its con-
struction of section 1985(3).
372. The Court held that the deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be a basis for a
cause of action under § 1985(3). Id. at 378. Thus, the Court in Novotny did not alter the Griffin
analysis for determining whether a cause of action exists under § 1985(3).
66 For example, in Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that § 1985(3) may be asserted against all private
discrimination fitting under the section's language on the authority of section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 1235. In Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 1985(3) is not assertable against any
private discrimination where the fourteenth amendment is relied upon as the sole constitutional
authority for Congress' regulation of the particular instance of private conduct alleged. Id. at
196. For a fuller treatment of GrOin's constitutional requirement, see text and notes at notes
96-113 infra.
67 For example, a Unification Church member was allowed by one court to sue under
1985(3) under facts similar to those in Ward, Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70, 75 (D. Ariz.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981), while
another Unification Church member was denied a cause of action under the section. Van Styn v.
Van Styn, No. 79-C-3468 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1980). For a fuller treatment of Griffin's statutory re-
quirements, see text and notes at notes 114-23 infra.
" See 495 F. Supp. at 436 and 657 F.2d at 47.
69
 403 U.S. at 97.
7° Id. at 102.
71
 See text and notes at notes 117-23 infra.
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A. The District Court's Repudiation
In reaching its conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of ac-
tion under section 1985(3), the district court in Ward employed Griffin's two-
step analysis. 72 Treating the first step, the court held that the plaintiff had not
alleged the infringement of a right which the federal government is constitu-
tionally able to protect from private discrimination. 73 The district court looked
behind the plaintiff's allegation of the infringement of his right to travel and
determined that the gravamen of the suit was the infringement of the plaintiff's
first amendment right to freedom of religious practice. 74 That right, the court
noted, may be protected only from state deprivations." Thus, the court viewed
the plaintiff's allegation of an infringement of free travel as a pretext for the
vindication of his right to religious freedom. Lacking any allegations of govern-
mental involvement in the defendants' conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his
freedom of religion, the court concluded that section 1985(3) could not be used
to grant alternative relief."
The district court in Ward did not rest its decision solely on its determina-
tion that the plaintiff had failed to allege the infringement of a right protectable
by the federal government from private discrimination. Applying the second
step of the Griffin analysis, the district court noted the failure of the plaintiff's
complaint to fulfill the statutory requirements of section 1985(3)." The district
court held that the plaintiff did not allege the "class-based invidiously
discriminatory animus" required by Grn. 78 The district court looked first to
the class allegedly discriminated against: members of the Unification Church.
The court declared that it was not convinced that Congress intended section
1985(3) to protect non-racial classifications." Noting that Griffin had expressly
reserved the question , 8° the district court employed a "discrete, insular and
immutable characteristics" test for determining whether religious classifica-
tions are protected under the statute." Because religious classifications involve
72 495 F. Supp. at 437.




" Id. at 437-38.
78 Id. at 437.
79 Id.
a° Id.
91 U. The "discrete, insular and immutable characteristics" test has been employed by
the Supreme Court to distinguish classes protected under the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). CI Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (characteristics relevant in deciding whether new classifications
"suspect").
Prior to its holding in Ward, the appeals court had approved the use of the discrete, in-
sular and immutable characteristics test to deny class status of a person who brought an action
under S 1985(3). See Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (E.D. Va. 1973),




characteristics voluntarily assumed, the court held they were not within the
scope of the statute. 82 Therefore, the court held as a threshhold matter that the
plaintiff did not fall within a class protected by section 1985(3). 83
Recognizing that courts had differing views on the class status of religious
groups, 84 the district court in Ward stated that even if the class alleged by the
plaintiff was protected, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the requisite bias
against the class." The district court noted that the defendants were plaintiff's
"closest blood relatives."'" The court found that the defendants were moti-
vated by their concern for a loved one rather than by bias against the Unifica-
tion Church. 87 The court also noted that the plaintiff was not the victim of
systematic racial terrorism, nor denied access to state remedies." The court
concluded that the suit therefore failed to fulfill the statutory requirement of a
discriminatory bias against a class. 89 Thus, the court declared, to grant the
plaintiff's cause of action would be to distort the purposes of section 1985(3). 9 °
B. The Circuit Court's Allowance
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's application
of both steps of the Griffin analysis and reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint." On the constitutional requirement, the circuit court held that the
infringement of any right which the federal government is empowered to pro-
tect from private discrimination satisfies the Griffin test, despite any contem-
poraneous infringement of a right not subject to such protections. 92 On the
statutory requirements, the circuit court held that religious groups constitute a
protected class, 93 and that the mere allegation of discriminatory bias is suffi-
cient to support an action under the section. 94 The circuit court concluded that
the section protects individuals from wholly private conspiracies aimed at
depriving freedom of religion where the right to interstate travel is also im-
pinged. 93 To understand fully the appeals court's decision, each part of its
treatment of the two-part Griffin test will be considered.
U 495 F. Supp. at 437.
83 Id. The district court recognized that the issue of class coverage was unsettled among
lower federal courts, and noted that several courts have granted the class status to religious
groups under 1985(3). Id. "Yet, we are persuaded, from a review of the better-reasoned deci-
sions	 that 1985(3) does not afford plaintiff a remedy in the instant case." Id.
84 Id.
83 Id.





91 657 F.2d at 49.
92 Id at 48.
93 Id.
9+ Id. at 49.
95 Id. at 48.
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III. A CRITIQUE OF THE WARD RESULT
A. The Requirement of Constitutional Authority
The first step of the Griffin analysis is the requirement of constitutional
authority for the federal government's regulation of private discrimination."
The authority cited by the Fourth Circuit in Ward was the congressional power
to protect the right of interstate travel.° The plaintiff in Ward alleged that the
interference with his intended interstate travel was an object of the conspiracy
and that his right was impinged by the abduction." The circuit court, acting
on dicta in Griffin implying that Congress has the power to protect the rights to
interstate travel from private deprivations, found the requisite constitutional
authority to be present." The circuit court rejected the lower court's examina-
tion of the "gravamen" of the plaintiff's complaint.'°° Rather, the court held
that the allegation of an interference with the right to travel satisfies Griffin's re-
quirement that the challenged activity be one against which Congress has the
authority to legislate."
While Ward's holding that the right to travel grants Congress the authority
to reach certain private acts of discrimination is a broad construction of that
right, the interpretation seems sound in light of Griffin. In declaring that sec-
tion 1985(3) affords protection to victims of wholly private discriminatory con-
spiracies, the Griffin Court recognized that specific constitutional authority
must be present to empower Congress to reach such private actors. " 2 One of
the source of authority identified by the Supreme Court was the right to
travel."3 The Court stated that the right has been recognized as among those
96
 403 U.S. at 104. See note 61 supra.






102 403 U.S. at 104. The Court noted that its inquiry did not need to find 5 1985(3) con-
stitutional in all possible applications of the section, but rather needed only to identify a source of
congressional power to reach the conspiracy alleged in the case before it. Id. Therefore, for ac-
tions arising under 1985(3), the constitutionality of the section's extension will turn on the
specific facts of each case.
103 Id. at 105-06. The Coffin Court also recognized the thirteenth amendment as a con-
stitutional source for the authority to reach private discrimination. Id, at 104-05. The thirteenth
amendment empowers Congress to identify discriminatory activities constituting "badges and
incidents of slavery" and to legislate against such acts. Id., citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). The Court concluded that Congress was within its power under sec-
tion two of the thirteenth amendment in granting the 5 1985(3) cause of action to Negro citizens.
403 U.S. at 105. In Griffin, all of the plaintiffs were Negroes; all of their assailants were white. Id.
at 89-90. The discriminatory activities allegedly perpetrated by the defendants fell within the
"badges and incidents of slavery" proscription of the thirteenth amendment. Id. at 105. Hence,
the Court's holding that the thirteenth amendment empowered Congress to reach private actors
through 5 1985(3) was sufficient to decide the case, and the Court could well have curtailed its
analysis at this point. That the Court did press forward to identify the right to travel as a basis for
constitutional authority is evidence that the Court did not intend 5 1985(3) to be limited to racial
discrimination. Since Griffin dealt with acts prohibited by both the right to travel and the thir-
teenth amendment, however, the Court had no need to consider what the full scope of $ 1985(3)'s
coverage would be when the right to travel is relied upon as the sole source of constitutional
authority.
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rights and privileges of national citizenship which are within Congress' power
to protect from private deprivation.'" The Griffin Court, however, cited no
constitutional provision for the proposition that the right to travel is constitu-
tionally protected. 1 Q5 Nevertheless, the Court went on to declare that not only
interferences with actual interstate travel, but also interferences with intended
interstate travel, empower Congress to provide statutory protection. 106 .
104 403 U.S. at 105-06.
105 It Rather, the Court relied on precedents to support its conclusion that the right to
travel does not rest solely upon the fourteenth amendment, and is assertable against both private
and governmental deprivations. Id. Of the precedents cited, the Griffin Court was necessarily
placing primary reliance on United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, (1966), as justification for its
construction of the right to travel. Guest dealt with the application of 18 U.S.C. 241 (1976), the
criminal counterpart of 1985(3), see note 39 supra, to a private conspiracy involving criminal
acts of racial discrimination. 383 U.S. at 746-47 & n. 1. Justice Stewart, as the sole justice speak-
ing for the Court in a severally divided decision, held that the right to travel is assertable against
private, as well as governmental deprivations. Id. at 759 n.17. As in Griffin, Justice Stewart's opin-
ion in Guest failed to identify a specific constitutional provision as establishing the right to travel,
but instead relied on precedent defining the right. Id. at 758. Justice Stewart concluded that
"Iallthough there have been recurring differences within the Court as to the source of the con-
stitutional right of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass those differences further. All
have agreed that the right exists." Id. at 759. Justice Stewart recognized that the precedent relied
upon to establish the existence of the right to travel involved only governmental interferences,
and did not address the issue of private infringements of the right. Id. at 759 n.17. Nevertheless,
he concluded that:
their reasoning fully supports the conclusion that the constitutional right of in-
terstate travel is a right secured against interference from any source whatever,
whether governmental or private. In this connection, it is important to reiterate
that the right to travel freely from State to State finds constitutional protection that
is quite independent of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
Justice Harlan, in a sharp dissent to this portion of Justice Stewart's opinion, declared
that no previous construction of the right to interstate travel supported the extension of congres-
sional authority in the case at bar. Id. at 763 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan then engaged
in the canvass of possible sources for the right which Justice Stewart had chosen to avoid. Id. at
764-70. Justice Harlan in turn considered and rejected the applicability of precedent grounding
the right in the privileges and immunities clause, the commerce clause and the due process
clause. Id. Justice Harlan noted that cases placing the source of the right to travel in the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment were
unavailing to the Guest Court because they treated only governmental deprivations of the right.
Id. at 764-67, 769-70. Justice Harlan also saw the commerce clause rationale as inapplicable,
since its authority stems from economic factors absent in the regulation of private criminal
discrimination. Id, at 767-69. Nor did Justice Harlan conclude that protecting the right to travel
against interference by private actors was justified by constitutional policy. Id. at 771. In-
fringements by governmental authorities of individual rights are by their nature of constitutional
magnitude, whereas infringements by private groups constitute at most a temporary
breakdown of law and order, to be remedied by the exercise of state authority or by appropriate
federal regulation." Id. at 772. The Court's recognition of the authority of Congress to secure the
right of interstate travel from the private deprivation involved in Guest, Justice Harlan concluded,
was unprincipled lawmaking, justified neither by explicit constitutional provision, nor by sound
constitutional policy. Id. at 771-73.
1 °6 403 U.S. at 106. Griffin expanded upon Guest's treatment of the right to travel in this
respect. Griffin sets out specific examples of private interferences with the right to travel which
may be protected by 5 1985(3). Id. at 106. In Guest, Justice Stewart had no occasion to enumerate
acts which constitute infringements of the right to travel since, in that case, the victims actually
were denied the use of highway facilities and other incidents of interstate travel. 383 U.S. at 757.
Justice Stewart concluded that, given the allegations of an actual denial of access to interstate
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Having determined that the plaintiff in Ward alleged that his intended in-
terstate travel was interrupted, the Fourth Circuit in Ward deemed the con-
stitutional requirement of the Griffin analysis to be satisfied. The appeals court
thus disregarded the district court's conclusion that state action was necessary
because the plaintiff's suit was in reality aimed at the vindication of first
amendment rights to religious freedom. In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has
followed the Supreme Court's most expansive reading of the right to travel as
empowering Congress to reach what were traditionally state law matters.
Nonetheless, the Ward court's construction of the right to travel seems quite
valid. The Supreme Court continues to consider the right to travel "virtually
unqualified. " 107
 Furthermore, there is some evidence that the Court has not
retreated from its determination that the right to travel is assertable against
both governmental and private actors.'" Nor has the Court declared any par-
ticular constitutional provision to be the source of the right to interstate
travel.' 09
 Given this vague but expansive construction of the right to interstate
travel by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit was justified in determining
that an incidental infringement of the right, if properly alleged as an object of
the conspiracy, suffices to ground constitutional authority to regulate private
conduct in satisfaction of Griffin's first requirement.
While the Supreme Court's construction of the right to travel implicitly
grants broad authority to the Congress, the unrestrained application of this
congressional authority to regulate private conduct would subsume a large
travel, it was open to the state to prove that the specific intent of the defendants was to infringe
the victims' right. Id. at 760.
In Griffin, the allegations in the complaint only tended to show that the plaintiffs may
have had their rights to interstate travel infringed. 403 U.S. at 106. In dicta, the Griffin opinion
set out several factors which, if proved, could constitute violations of federal protected rights:
[Ilt is open to the petitioners to prove at trial that they had been engaging in in-
terstate travel or intended to do so, that their federal right to travel interstate was
one of the rights meant to be discriminatorily impaired by the conspiracy, that the
conspirators intended to drive out-of-state civil rights workers from the State, or
that they meant to deter the petitioners from associating with such persons.
Id. Under this language, a conspiracy which interfered with a plaintiff's intended interstate travel
would apparently be actionable. Combined with the Court's rejection of the necessity of a specific
intent to deprive the protected right, id. at 102 n.10, the inclusion of the mere intent to travel
language signaled an expansion of Guest in that all tortious conduct involving a detention of the
plaintiff would thus come within Congress' authority by virtue of the plaintiff's claim that he in-
tended to engage in interstate travel.
107 Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1978) (per curiam), citing United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. at 757-58 and Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 105-06.
108 See, e.g., Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979)
(Stevens, J., concurring): Some privileges and immunities of citizenship, such as the right to
engage in interstate travel ... are protected by the Constitution against interference by private
action, as well as impairment by state action." Id. at 383.
100
 Jones v. Helms, 101 S.Ct. 2434, 2439 (1981) (textual source of the right to travel a
subject of debate); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 (1980) (constitu-
tion protects important but unarticulated rights such as the right to travel despite their not being
enumerated); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1974) ("ultimate
scope" of the right to travel remains unsettled); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375
(1971) (source of the constitutional right has never been ascribed to any particular provision).
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share of traditional state tort law matters under a general federal tort law."°
The Griffin Court recognized that such an expansive role for the Congress
would offend principles of federalism."' The Court ruled, however, that the
proper balance between federal and state functions could be reached by de-
manding strict adherence to the requirements of section 1985(3). 12 Hence, to
avoid the federalization of tort law, a close reading of Griffin's statutory re-
quirements is mandated."'
B. The Requirement of Statutory Coverage
The second step of the Griffin analysis is the requirement that the case fit
within the language of section 1985(3). 14 The Fourth Circuit in Ward noted
that the complaint alleged a conspiracy, with an act in furtherance of the con-
spiracy and an actual injury to the plaintiff and, therefore, that the three of the
four statutory requirements were met."' Thus the treatment of the second
clause of the section was determinative of the plaintiff's cause of action." 6
The language of the second clause of section 1985(3) speaks in terms of the
denial of equal protection. " 2 The Supreme Court in Griffin interpreted this
"° See generally The Supreme Cowl, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 99 n.29, 103 (1971);
Note, State Action No Longer a Requisite Under 42 U. S. C. 1985(3) — Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88 (1971), 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 168, 177 (1971).
1 " 403 U.S. at 101.
The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting 5 1985(3) as a
general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional
purpose — by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of in-
vidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting
amendment.
Id. at 102.
"2 Id. at 102. The same result had been reached by the Court with regard to actions
arising under 18 U.S.C. 5 241 (1976), the criminal analogue to 5 1985(3). See note 39 supra. See
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. at 760. In Guest, Justice Stewart declared the reach of congres-
sional authority to regulate criminal deprivations of the right of interstate travel to be restricted
by the language of that section to situations in which the specific intent of the conspirators was to
deprive the victim of the right to interstate travel. Id. Likewise, in Griffin, the Court declared the
reach of federal power to private actors to be limited by the language of 1985(3) to situations in
which the infringement is motivated by an invidiously discriminatory class bias. 403 U.S. at 102.
"3 See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977). ("We
remain mindful ... of the Supreme Court's evident concern in Griffin over the broad literal
sweep of the statute. That concern dictates the exercise' of restraint when a court is confronted
with class-based discrimination ground in a non-racial animus." Id. at 929); Furumoto v.
Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973). ("In extending Griffin, thus, precision must be
maintained." Id. at 1286).
" 4
 403 U.S. at 102. See note 61 supra.
116
 Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d at 47 n.2.
" 6 Id. at 47.
'" The language of the section states: "for purpose of depriving ... the equal protec-
tion of the laws, or ... equal privilege's and immunities under the laws ...." 42 U.S.C.
1985(3) (Supp. III 1979). As noted by the Grn Court, the section's language parallels the
language of section one of the fourteenth amendment which provides, in part, that no state "shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens ... nor deny ... equal protection of the laws."
403 U.S. 96-97.
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clause as requiring "invidiously discriminatory class-based animus.""s The
Griffin Court noted that Congress did not intend to proscribe all private con-
spiratorial interferences with the rights of others." 9 Indeed, the Court implied
that constitutional consideration would bar the interpretation of the section as a
general federal tort law. 12° These constitutional difficulties would be avoided,
the Court declared, by construing the second element of the section to require
invidiously discriminatory class-based animus as the motivation for the con-
spirators' injurious actions. 12 '
The Griffin Court's discussion of invidiously discriminatory class-based
animus was not exhaustive. The Court did, however, implicitly identify two
components of the requirement. The first component requires the existence of
some identifiable class to which the plaintiff belongs. 122 The second component
requires the presence of an invidiously discriminatory bias against that class
which motivates the conspiracy.'" Thus a conspiracy that is both aimed at an
individual who is a member of a protected class, and motivated by hatred of the
victim's class is a conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving ... a person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws . . ." in violation of section
1985(3).
1. The Class Component
The Griffin Court left unresolved what classes were to be protected by sec-
tion 1985(3). 124 Because Griffin involved racial classifications, the Court limited
its holding to the facts before it. In its opinion, however, the Court included
language implicitly allowing a broader reading of the section, and referred to
legislative history tending to show that the section, as contemplated by its
framers, was to reach more than just racial discrimination.'"
'" Id. at 102. "The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal
privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' actions." Id. (emphasis sup-
plied by the Court).
"9 Id. at 101. "That the statute was meant to reach private action does not, however,
mean that it was intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the right of
others." Id.
170 See note 111 supra.
1 " 403 U.S. at 102. The Court's apparent motive for predicating the applicability of
$ 1985(3) on presence of class-based animus was the difficulty that legitimate plaintiffs would face
in proving that their assailants were in fact motivated by a desire to deny equal protection of the
laws. Therefore, under the Court's construction of this clause of 5 1985(3), the denial of equal
protection or equal privileges and immunities called for by the statute's language must necessari-
ly be assumed when bias against a class protected by the section motivates the conspiratorial
deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. Id. at 102. Focus for the violation of the statute will be on the
presence of such an invidiously discriminatory animus, not on the specific intent of the con-
spirators to deprive the victim of a federal right. Id. at 102 n.10.
122 Id. at 103.
' 23 Id.
124 Id. at 102 n.9. "We need not decide ... whether a conspiracy motivated by in-
vidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be actionable...." Id.
125 Id. But see note 103 supra. After declining to elaborate on the scope of 5 1985(3)'s
class protection, the Court cited, without quoting, the remarks of Senator Edmunds during con-
gressional debates over passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1891. Id, In the passage referred to,
the senator stated:




In Ward, the Fourth Circuit deemed the class component of Griffin's
gloss' 25 to be crucial to the applicability of section 1985(3) to the case at
hand.'" The circuit court noted that the district court in Ward had doubted
whether the section was intended to reach conspiracies not motivated by racial
animus.'" The court acknowledged the limiting language of the Griffin opin-
ion, as well as the decision's express reservation of the question of what other
classes were encompassed by the section.'" The circuit court emphasized,
however, that the legislative history of section 1985(3) implied an expansive
class coverage under the statute.'" The court also noted that some lower
federal courts have extended the section's protection to religious groups."' Ac-
cordingly, the circuit court concluded that Griffin's construction of section
1985(3) supports the extension of the statutory protection to religious classifica-
tions. 132
The circuit court in Ward reached its conclusion that religious groups con-
stitute classes within the protection of section 1985(3) without propounding
either a rule for the extension or a rationale for protecting victims of religious
discrimination. Instead, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on precedent in other
lower federal courts recognizing religious groups as classes protected by the
section.' 33 Supported by this authority, the circuit court simply declared that
conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud of one man or set of men against
another to prevent one getting an indictment in the State courts against men for
burning down his barn; but, if in a case like this, it should appear that this con-
spiracy was formed against this man because he was a Democrat ... or because he
was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist .. then this section could reach it.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871).
126 See text at note 64 supra.
127 657 F.2d at 47. "[Tlhe principal question before us is whether a religious group




"° Id. at 48.
131 Id.
"2 Id.
" 3 Id. The Ward Court pointed to four cases as precedent for the extension of 1 1985(3)
to religious classifications. The court cited Action v. Cannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971), in
which the Eighth Circuit held that victims of private religious discrimination are protected under
the statute. Id. at 1234-35. Significantly, however, the Action court did not hold that religious
groups are a class within the statutory meaning. Rather, the court held that the first amendment
guarantees are assertable against private individuals under section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id. at 1234-35. The Action court then declared that conspiracies to deprive religious
freedom motivated by race and economic class animus are within 11985(3)'s coverage. Id. at
1232. The Ward court also cited Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th cir. 1973), where
the Sixth Circuit held that class bias predicated on both religion and national origin is within the
scope of the statute. Id. at 1065. Thus, the Marlowe court did not recognize religious classifica-
tions as independently protected under the section. However, the Sixth Circuit court subsequent-
ly cited Marlowe in dicta as holding that religious groups are so protected. Browder v. Tipton 630
F.2d 1149, 1152 (6th Cir. 1980). In the third and fourth cases cited by Ward, federal district
courts also concluded that religious classes are protected under the section. Rankin v. Howard,
457 F. Supp. 70, 74-75 (D. Ariz. 1978), rev 'd on other grounds, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981); Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 491 (N.D. Cal. 1978). To reinforce
its conclusion that the consensus among lower federal courts favors extending 1 1985(3) to
religious groups, the Fourth Circuit in Ward also cited dicta in two other cases which support this
notion, 657 F.2d at 47, citing Western Telecasters, Inc. v. California Fed. of Labor, AFL-CIO,
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courts had almost unanimously extended section 1985(3) coverage to religious
groups, and that it would follow suit.'" The appeals court's failure to identify
the rationale it employed in extending section 1985(3)'s protection is troubling
since prior to Ward the Fourth Circuit had not addressed the issue of the class
status of religious groups.' 35
In failing to identify a test for determing class status under section
1985(3), the Ward court mirrored the reasoning of many other federal courts
presented with non-racial groups seeking redress under the statute.'" Some
federal courts, however, have groped for tangible guidelines to be used to
415 F. Supp. 30, 33 (S.D. Cal. 1976); Arnold v. Tiffany, 359 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (C.D. Cal.
1973), aff'd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974). Thus,
precedent is present for the extension of S 1985(3) to religious classes. However, as the district
court in Baer v. Baer noted after surveying relevant case law, the precedents are "by no means
compelling." 450 F. Supp. at 491-.
"4 657 F.2d at 48. "[T]he lower federal courts have, almost without exception, ex-
tended the coverage of the statute to religious groups.... In light of these cases, and the
legislative history, we think it reasonable to conclude'that religious discrimination ... falls within
the ambit of [ 1985(3)]." Id. While it agreed with the conclusions of these courts, the Fourth
Circuit did not cite the rationale of any of the cases relied upon as singularly persuasive. Id. This
is significant as it points up the absence of a consensus among lower courts on the rule to be
followed for defining classes to be protected under the section. See note 137 infra.
Of the cases relied upon by the Fourth Circuit, the clearest rationale for the extension of
class status to religious groups is presented by the Baer court. The court stated:
While religious status may differ from racial status because it is not a congenital
and inalterable trait, membership in a minority religious group, like membership
in a minority racial group, has often excited the fear, hatred and irrationality of
the majority. Two thousand years of human history compellingly prove that no
easier road to martyrdom is found than in adherence to an unpopular religious
faith.
450 F. Supp. at 491. Neither the Marlowe nor Rankin courts offered any rationale for its extension
of Griffin. See Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d at 1065. Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. at 74.
Finally, the Action court's rationale is contrary to Fourth Circuit precedent. In a case prior to
Ward, the Fourth Circuit held that the fourteenth amendment does not empower 1985(3) to
reach private actors. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504, 507 (4th Cir. 1974). The
Action court, however, held that the fourteenth amendment may be relied upon to reach private
discriminators. Thus, the Action court held that because the gravamen of the conspiracy alleged
involved the deprivation of first amendment rights to freedom of religion, the fourteenth amend-
ment authorized S 1985(3) to reach the private discriminators. 450 F.2d at 1234-35. In this
regard, the Ward court's reliance on Action appears misplaced.
"5 See Rodgers v. Tolson, 582 F.2d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 1978).
' 36
 The absence of a valid guiding principle has resulted in the recognition or refusal of
groups' class status on an apparent ad hoc basis. See Carchman v. Korman Corp., 456 F. Supp.
730, 735 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898 (1979),
and cases cited therein. Compare Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 844) (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 958 (1976) (class status of political group supporting candidate for office recognized)
with Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267, 1286 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (class status of political pro-
testers denied). Compare Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1386 (6th Cir. 1972) (class status of
single, white middle-class family recognized) with Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1209 (5th
Cir. 1979) (class status of white farm families denied). Compare Local No. 1 (ACA), Broadcast
Employees of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 419 F.
Supp. 263, 277 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (class status of union recognized) with Western Telecasters, Inc.




determine the validity of classes claiming protection under section 1985(3).'"
Among the guidelines proposed, one would limit classes protected under the
section to those possessing discrete, insular and immutable characteristics.' 38
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Browder v. Tipton' 39
 denied the class status of the plaintiffs because they did not
possess such characteristics.'" The Browder court reasoned that restricting the
scope of section 1985(3) to classes with discrete, insular and immutable charac-
teristics both protects those groups recognized by the Supreme Court as vulner-
able to discrimination, and limits the categories of potential plaintiffs. 14 '
Nevertheless, neither this guideline, nor any other, has been uniformly em-
ployed by the courts.'"
Prior to its decision in Ward, the Fourth Circuit had recognized the
discrete, insular and immutable characteristics test as the correct measure for
determining the classes that are to be protected under section 1985(3). In
Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc. , 143
 the class status of a group was denied by a
district court because it was not defined by discrete, insular and immutable
characteristics such as race, sex and alienage. 144 In affirming the district court's
holding, however, the circuit court implied that religious classifications would
" 7
 Although a number of rules have been advanced establishing criteria for determining
protected classes under 1985(3), no consensus has been reached among federal courts on the
use of any one principle. See, e.g., Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 928 (9th Cir.
1975) (groups constituting classes must be defined by characteristics other than merely having
been victims of same conduct). Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, 215, vacated per
cunam as moot, 507 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975) (groups protected must be class sharing some "in-
tellectual nexus"); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973) (groups accorded pro-
tection must constitute "clearly defined class"); Carchman v. Korman Corp., 456 F. Supp. 730,
736 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 594 F. 2d 354 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898 (1979) (groups
protected will be those whose stable, well defined characteristics have been historically vulnerable
to prejudice).
13° See, e.g., Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1153 (6th Cir. 1980); Carchman v. Kor-
man Corp., 594 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898 (1979); Three Rivers Cable-
vision, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 502 F. Supp. 1118, 1133-34 (W.D. Pa. 1980). The test has also
been used on several occasions by district courts in the Fourth Circuit. See Savina v. Gebhart, 497
F. Supp. 65, 68 (D. Md. 1980); Kent Island joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 459 (D.
Md. 1978); Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd,,
508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
' 39
 630 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir. 1980). These criteria for class status derive from traditional
equal protection clause analysis under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1152. See note 81 supra.
' 40
 630 F.2d at 1153. In Browder, the plaintiffs, employees of a freight line company who
alleged that the defendants caused them to be arrested because they crossed defendants' picket
line, were denied a cause of action under the section for the failure to allege a protected class. Id.
at 1154-55.
141
 Id. at 1152-53.
"2 See note 137 supra. As noted by one court, this absence of a guiding rule has resulted
in a situation where " [i]n order to avoid problems inherent in construing 5 1985(3) as a general
Federal Tort Law, many lower courts have engaged in a course of sophistry that would warm the
cockles of the heart of a 14th century metaphysician." Ackley v. Maple Woodman Assocs., 15
Ohio Op. 3d 420, 422 (Ohio Ct. C.F. 1979).
' 43
 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
144
 368 F. Supp. at 1028. Ironically, the plaintiff in Bellamy seeking protection under the
Ku Klux Klan Act was himself a member of the United Klans of America who claimed he was
discriminated against because of his membership in that organization. Id. at 1027.
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be deemed as having the required characteristics for class status under section
1985(3). 145
In Ward, the Fourth Circuit did not address its prior recognition of the
discrete, insular and immutable characteristics test in Bellamy. The court did
note, however, that it was persuaded that religious groups constitute classes
qualifying for protection because of their similarity to racial classes, which were
expressly recognized by Griffin as within the ambit of section 1985(3). 146 Thus,
the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Ward probably does not signal the court's total
rejection of the discrete, insular and immutable characteristics test for class
qualification. Rather, Ward demonstrates that the court will employ the test
only as a rough benchmark against which the characteristics of a group may be
measured. In this regard, the Fourth Circuit, under Bellamy and Ward, has ap-
parently adopted an approach to class status very similar to that employed by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Browder. 147
The Fourth Circuit's determination in Ward that religious groups qualify
as classes under section 1985(3) rests on firm ground. Not only is this result im-
plicitly mandated by Griffin,'" but it is also a logical extension of the discrete,
insular and immutable characteristics criteria previously employed by the
Fourth Circuit. These criteria have been used in equal protection analysis to
identify and protect politically powerless minorities from discriminatory
governmental actions. 149 In the application of the criteria, religious groups
have not been deemed a "suspect class' 150 worthy of heightened equal protec-
145 508 F.2d at 505. The appeals court based its affirmance of the district court's result
on the absence of constitutional authority to support 5 1985(3)'s extension. Id. at 507. Thus, the
Fourth Circuit apparently deemed the class aspect of the statutory requirements to be satisfied,
although it did not address either the use of the discrete, insular and immutable characteristics
test or the plaintiff's status under the test. The court, therefore, apparently recognized the test as
valid, but implicitly deemed the class coverage under the test as not confined to those classes
traditionally protected under the equal protection clause.
148 657 F.2d at 48.
' 47 In Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir. 1980), the Sixth Circuit, while
putatively employing the class text for the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause actions,
noted the valid class status of religious groups. 630 F.2d at 1152. Religious classes have not been
recognized as qualifying for special protection under the traditional test for the equal protection'
clause. See note 152 infra. The Sixth Circuit, therefore, seemed to couch the recognition of the
class status of religious groups under the section in terms of groups historically subject to class
discrimination. Id. at 1153. Thus, for class status under the section, the Sixth Circuit implicitly
deemed the coverage of the traditional equal protection clause criteria to include religious
classifications, because that test was propounded to protect classes such as religious groups that
are discriminated against due to societal prejudice. Id. at 1153. But cf. Novotny v. Great Am.
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366
(1979) (recognizing class status of women because gender is an immutable characteristic and
hence one for which class members bear no responsibility).
148 The recognition of religious groups' status is compelled by Griffin's implicitly expan-
sive treatment of the class coverage in which the Court expressly reserved its judgment while
noting portions of legislative history demonstrating an inclusive congressional intent. 403 U.S. at
102 n.9. See note 125 supra.
149 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). '
"° See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). Classes recognized as quali-
fying for special protection under the traditional test include those based on race, national origin,
alienage and sex. Id. See generally J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 535 -623 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
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tion scrutiny. Because religion is accorded its own special status under the
Constitution, 15 ' however, the invocation of "suspect class" status has not been
necessary to restrain the government from interfering with first amendment
rights to freedom of religion. 152 By its holding in Ward, the Fourth Circuit
recognized the protected status religious groups enjoy under the Constitution,
and extended the protection of section 1985(3) to conspiracies motivated by
bias against them.' 53
In summary, the Ward court held that religious groups are within the
scope of classes protected by section 1985(3). Although the court failed to ar-
ticulate a clear standard by which to determine what constitutes a protected
class under the statute, the ruling seems warranted by both the legislative
history of section 1985(3) and by judicial precedent. Furthermore, by holding
that religious groups are a protected class, the Fourth Circuit has exhibited
proper deference towards a group accorded special treatment by the Constitu-
tion. Having thus determined that religious group may claim section 1985(3)'s
protection, it remained for the court to decide if the discrimination alleged
violated the statute.
2. The Bias Component
To state a claim under Griffin's interpretation of section 1985 (3), a plain-
tiff must also allege that an invidiously discriminatory bias against a protected
class to which he belongs motivated the conspiracy at issue)." The district
court in Ward reasoned that since the plaintiff's complaint alleged no facts
tending to show that the defendants were motivated by anything other than
their familial concern for a loved one, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of ac-
tion under section 1985(3).' 55 The Fourth Circuit in Ward rejected the district
court's conclusion that a sufficient demonstration of class bias was absent in the
"' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"2
 This result is not startling. The fourteenth amendment, which encompasses the
equal protection clause, by its terms reaches only to the actions of state governments. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV § 1. Hence, the classes identified under equal protection clause analysis are
accorded protection only from governmental deprivations of equal rights. NOWAK, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 150, at 518. Religious classifications, however, are already protected
from unequal treatment by governmental bodies by the first amendment. "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. . . " U.S.
CONST. amend. I. Thus, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court employed a
close review (similar to the equal protection clause analysis of suspect classifications) of a law
allegedly burdening free religious exercise. Id. at 214. The Court concluded that public school
compulsory attendance laws could be applied to Amish children after completion of the eighth
grade only if the requirement does not infringe the free exercise of a religious belief, or alter-
natively, if a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the claimed interest is present. Id.
at 214-15. Therefore, given the first amendment's bar to governmental denial of religious equali-
ty, protection of religious groups under the equal protection clause would be redundant.
1 " 657 F.2d at 48.
154 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 103. See also Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717,
723 (D.R.I. 1978), aff'd mem. (588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978); Bradley v. Clegg, 403 F. Supp. 830,
833 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Spencer v. Community Hosp. of Evanston, 393 F. Supp. 1072, 1079
(N.D. Ill. 1975)).
"5 495 F. Supp. at 437-38.
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plaintiff's complaint.' 56
 In reversing the lower court's conclusion, the appeals
court exercised only a cursory review of the bias allegations contained in plain-
tiff Ward's complaint.'" The circuit court recognized the validity of the district
court's assumption that parental concern was a major impetus to the alleged
kidnapping.'" Nonetheless, the court found that the mere allegation of the
defendant's animosity towards the members of the Unification Church was
sufficient to establish an inference of the existence of class bias, enabling the
plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss.'"
It is not clear, however, that Ward's cursory treatment of the bias require-
ment is mandated by Griffin. Characterizing the existence of an invidiously
discriminatory bias as solely a question of fact satisfied by bare allegation does
not accord with Griffin's treatment of the requirement. While Griffin did not
purport to define fully what motivating bias would be required to satisfy the
statute,'" a close reading of the case supports the conclusion that the Supreme
Court did not deem the bias requirement to be satisfied by simply alleging that
such a bias exists.
The Griffin Court, in reaching the conclusion that the bias against the
plaintiffs' class was sufficiently alleged to support the inference of its existence,
looked to the specific allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint.'" The Griffin
Court noted that the complaint alleged that the conspiracy involved a brutal
beating, and was motivated by the defendants' desire to intimidate the Negro
community as a whole to thus deprive them of their civil rights.'" Further-
more, the complaint reinforced the allegation that the conspiracy was
motivated by racial bias with the further allegation that the conspirators were
acting under the mistaken belief that at least some of the plaintiffs were civil
rights activists.'" The Court concluded that given these allegations,'" the
plaintiffs' complaint clearly supported an inference of the requisite animus.' 65
"9 657 F.2d at 49.
159 Id. The appeals court devoted only one paragraph to its analysis of the bias require-
ment.
'" Id. "[W]e do not quarrel with the [district] court's assumption in regard to such
parental concern . " Id.
159 Id. The court stated that "the complaint sufficiently charges that the defendants were
motivated to act as they did ... because of their animosity towards the members of the Unifica-
tion Church." Id. Thus, the appeals court saw the clause as possibly involving mixed motives,
and allowed the action to proceed to determine whether class bias was indeed present.
' 6° 403 U.S. at 102 n.9.
161 Id. at 103.
162 Id, All of the plaintiffs in Griffin were members of the Negro race, id. at 89, and the
conspiracy was alleged to have been aimed at them because of this shared characteristic. Id. at
103.
163 Id.
164 There were no allegations of personal animosity between the defendants and plain-
tiffs, nor any evidence that the defendants knew the plaintiffs at all. Id. at 89-92. Indeed, allega-
tions in the complaint that the defendants were acting under the mistaken belief that the plaintiffs
were civil rights activists support the conclusion that the defendants were motivated not by per-
sonal animosity, but rather by class hatred against the plaintiffs' race. Id. at 90.
169 Id. at 103. The Griffin Court's determination that the plaintiffs' case satisfied the bias
requirement was influenced by its perception of the close similarity between the acts alleged and
those sought to be reached by the framers of S 1985(3). Id. at 103. The intent of the Forty-Second
Congress in enacting the legislation from which 5 1985(3) is derived was to provide protection to
persons terrorized by the Klan and similar organizations because of their membership in a
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Thus, the Griffin analysis requires, at a minimum, the allegation of specific
facts which by their character tend to demonstrate the presence of an invidious
class bias.'"
In the wake of Griffin, few fixed rules have emerged among lower federal
courts to test whether the allegations made in a section 1985(3) claim support
an inference of the presence of the requisite bias. Generally, it has been stated
disfavored class. See text and notes at notes 26-31 supra. As noted by the Solicitor General's
amicus brief in Griffin:
Considering the conditions prevailing at the time of [5' 1985(3)'s enactment], it
would have been wholly natural to infer an intent to inhibit equal enjoyment of
rights by Negroes from an assault that was shown to be motivated by the race of
the victim, rather than by personal animosity against him as an individual. And, unhappi-
ly, circumstances have not so changed in a century as to render such a presump-
tion unreasonable today — subject to rebuttal in a proper case.
Memorandum Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 18, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88 (1971) (emphasis added). Thus, under the interpretation of 1985(3) proposed by the
Solicitor General, a presumption that the intent of the conspirators was to deny the victim's en-
joyment of equal rights would be valid when the conspiracy was motivated by the victim's race.
Id. As the amicus brief went on to note, however: "It is another matter ... to establish that the
assault was directed at the race of the victim, not at the man." Id. The amicus brief argued that
the Griffin plaintiffs' complaint was sufficient in this regard because it did not make only "con-
clusory allegations," but also "particularized" its allegations of racial motive. Id. at 19. With
these allegations made, the amicus brief concluded, the plaintiffs had raised a question of fact to
be proved at trial "that they were the victims of a conspiracy designed to intimidate them because
of their race, and, through them, the black community .... " Id. Thus, the amicus brief did not
conclude that from the mere allegation that the defendants were white and the plaintiffs were
black a presumption of class bias motivating the conspiracy would be valid. Rather, the Solicitor
General deemed the inference of class bias to be justified in Griffin because of the further allega-
tions in the complaint establishing the relationship between the parties and injuries involved. Id.
at 19.
In Griffin, the Court implicitly agreed with the amicus brief's conclusion that the defend-
ant's class bias could be readily imputed from the unprovoked and random beating of a group of
blacks on a country road in Mississippi in 1966, and thus a separate study of the bias element was
not necessary. However, the Griffin Court placed some importance on the further allegation in
the complaint of the defendant's mistaken belief that one plaintiff was a civil rights worker. 403
U.S. at 103. The Court's reliance on this added allegation of fact supporting the class bias allega-
tion was a factor in winning the statutory protection, and its conclusion points to the Court's un-
willingness to assume a discriminatory bias absent more showing. Whether the Court would have
allowed the cause of action if Griffin had involved an act from which class bias was not so easily in-
ferred is uncertain given the terse treatment of the bias requirement.
166 That Griffin requires facts demonstrating class bias is reinforced by the legislative
history which the Court noted with apparent approval. Id. at 102 n.9, citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871) (Remarks of Sen. Edmunds). See note 125 supra. There the senator
declared that the section was not intended to reach a neighborhood feud giving rise to a con-
spiracy to prevent the victim from gaining an indictment for the burning down of his barn.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567. According to the senator, the statute would, however,
protect a victim whose barn was burned down because he was in a disfavored class. Id. The
distinction drawn between these two situations was the class bias present in the latter case. Id.
This hypothetical illustration does not declare that to avoid the sweep of the section's coverage,
the parties in the "neighborhood feud" situation need necessarily have homogeneous class
characteristics. Id. Rather, the illustration — which must be considered in the context of the
debates over Klan activity in which it is set — maintains that when a person who is a member of
one of the classes which were being systematically victimized by Klan organizations is singled out
and injured in a manner consistent with Klan terrorism because of his class, that person will be
protected. Id. Conversely, when a person is injured as a result of a neighborhood dispute, class
membership and the nature of the injury notwithstanding, that person's cause of action will be
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that the complaint must allege facts showing both that the criteria defining the
class were invidious, and that the defendants were motivated by the plaintiff's
class status. 157 Furthermore, there appears to be general agreement among
courts that the discriminatory bias must be directed at a class; conspiracies
motivated by a desire to deprive everyone generally of some right will not suf-
fice,'" nor will conspiracies motivated by a desire to deprive an individual qua
individual of equal protection of the laws.'" Finally, it has been held that con-
clusory allegations that class bias motivated the defendants' behavior will not
support a cause of action under the section absent factual evidence supporting
those conclusions. 170
The principal indicium available to a court with which to determine the
sufficiency of a plaintiff's allegations of discriminatory bias is the relationship
among the parties to the suit, the class allegedly discriminated against, and the
injury claimed.' 7 ' If examination of this relationship does not demonstrate a
class-motivated bias, the plaintiff's claim may be dismissed.' 72 For example, in
outside the scope of the protection afforded. Id. Only conspiracies executed "so as to deprive
classes ... of their constitutional right to protection and equality were to be within the ambit of
the statute as it was conceived by its framers." Id. Thus, even the example in the legislative
history noted by Griffin would seem to require allegations which demonstrate that the conspiracy
alleged was not merely the result of a neighborhood feud — or a family disagreement, but rather
was in fact motivated by a desire to deprive "classes of the community of their constitutional
rights." Id.
167 See, e.g., Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605, 608 (10th Cir. 1979); Harrison v.
Brooks, 519 F.2d 1358, 1360 (1st Cir. 1975); Phillips v. Fisher, 445 F, Supp. 552, 555 (D. Kan.
1977).
I" Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1153 (6th Cir. 1980); Taylor v. Brighton Corp.,
616 F.2d 256, 266 (6th Cir. 1980); Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 928 (9th Cir.
1975).
169 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 637 F.2d 743, 748 (10th Cir. 1980); Hughes v.
Ranger Fuel Corp., Div. of Pittston Co., 467 F.2d 6, 10 (4th Cir. 1972); Carchman v. Korman
Corp., 456 F. Supp. 730, 734 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444
U.S. B98 (1979). The Fourth Circuit's decision in Ward is significant in that the court allowed a
suit to stand where the complaint alleged class bias on facts which by themselves demonstrated
only bias against' the plaintiff as an individual. 657 F.2d at 48.
"° See, e.g., Herrmann v. Moore, 576 F.2d 453, 457 (2d Cir. 1978); Robinson v. Mc-
Corkle, 462 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1972); German v. Killeen, 495 F. Supp. 822, 829 (E.D.
Mich. 1980); Morpurgo v. Board of Higher Educ. in New York, 423 F. Supp. 704, 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Schoonfield v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 399 F. Supp. 1068, 1086
aff'd, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir. 1976); Kerckhoff v. Kerckhoff, 369 F. Supp. 1165, 1166 (F.D. Mo.
1974), aff'd, 505 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1974).
1 " See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 103. In Griffin, the Court specifically
singled out the factual allegations of the defendants' misidentification of the plaintiffs (demon-
strating both racial bias and nonfamiliarity between the parties), the racial class differences be-
tween the parties, and the physical injuries allegedly inflicted. Id. at 89-90. From its perception of
the relationship among these factors, the Court then concluded that an inference of class bias was
established. Id. at 103. The relationship among the parties, class and injury alleged is not the ex-
clusive basis for a court's conclusion, however. See, e.g., Selzer v. Berkowitz, 459 F. Supp. 347,
351 (E.D.N.Y., 1978) (derogatory public statements made by defendants about plaintiff's class
support class bias inference); Croswell v. O'Hara, 443 F. Supp. 895, 897 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (suffi-
ciency of class bias allegation depends on totality of factual circumstances).
72 See, e.g., German v. Killeen, 495 F. Supp. 922, 929 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Jackson v.
Associated Hosp. Serv. of Philadelphia, 414 F. Supp. 315, 325-26 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 549
F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977); Kerckhoff v. Kerckhoff, 369 F. Supp.
1165, 1166 (E.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 505 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1974); contra, Reichardt v. Payne, 396
F. Supp. 1010, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979).
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a case where the plaintiff alleged racial discrimination, but other factual allega-
tions contained in the complaint tended to show that the tortious conduct was
motivated by mere avarice, one court reasoned that the complaint must allege
facts which demonstrate that class bias indeed may have motivated the
challenged conduct.'" The Fourth Circuit, in a case prior to Ward, had
recognized the necessity of this further showing of class-directed bias. In Hughes
v. Ranger Fuel Corp., Division of Pittston Corp., 174 the court addressed the issue of
whether individuals allegedly assaulted by employees of the defendant (while
taking photographs of a dangerous landslide caused by the defendant mining
corporation) could state a claim under section 1985(3).'" The appeals court
declared that the allegations suggested only a bias against the plaintiffs in-
dividually, not as members of a class. 176 Thus, the court held, where class bias
was not readily apparent, the plaintiffs could not maintain an action under sec-
tion 1985(3) absent factual allegations that the defendants' acts were part of a
general pattern of discrimination directed at a class of which the plaintiffs were
members."'
Despite prior recognition of the requirement of clear factual allegations by
'" In Phillips v. Fisher, 445 F. Supp. 552 (D. Kan. 1977), the court. stated:
We do not say today that a plaintiff who seeks relief from alleged racial
discrimination must allege facts which inescapably lead to the finding of a race-
based animus on the part of the defendant. There are situations where the facts
alleged themselves lead to a reasonable inference that the motive behind a defend-
ant's actions may have been race. For example, if a black man is refused service in
a restaurant, an allegation that the cause thereof was racial prejudice squares with
the common experience of men in everyday life, and the causative inference is a
logical one to draw. If a black man is arrested fleeing the scene of a bank robbery,
[however,] it does not comport with the common experience of men to infer that
the motive ... for his arrest is his race; other apparent motives so
predominate as to make inferences of racial discrimination laughable.
Id. at 556.57, quoting Steele v. Bunton, No. 77-4152 (D. Kan. Oct, 4, 1977). Thus, in Phillips u.
Fisher, the court held that although racial class differences were present and there was no evidence
that the parties were acquainted outside of the tortious conduct, the allegation by the plaintiff, a
Negro, that he was robbed by the defendants, white moving van operators, because of his race
does not establish the type of relationship among the parties, class and injury necessary to sup-
port an inference of class bias. 445 F. Supp. 557. Consequently, the court in Phillips dismissed
the plaintiff's federal claim. Id.
14 467 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1972).
"5 Id. at 8.
16 Id. at 10.
'" Id. In addition, the court in Hughes noted with approval a decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in which the "general pattern of discriminatory
action" language was employed. Id. at 10 n.12, citing Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 447 (2d
Cir. 1969). It is interesting to note that the district court in Ward by its reasoning implicitly
followed the lead of the Hughes decision. After reviewing the congressional purpose in enacting
S 1985(3) — to provide a remedy for victims of Klan violence — the district court in Ward con-
cluded that as the plaintiff "is not a victim of systematic racial terrorism," he stated no claim
cognizable under the statute. 495 F. Supp. at 438. The requirement that a plaintiff show that he
was the victim of a general pattern of discrimination against his class has also been recognized by
other courts. See German v. Killeen, 495 F. Supp. 922, 929 (F.D. Mich. 1980). Cf. McNally v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 65, 75 (8th Cir. 1976) (absence of allegations showing pattern
of tortious conduct directed at others due to shared class characteristics defeats cause) Action v.
Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1971) (facts showing pattern of challenged conduct
against other class members support cause). This requirement has not been uniformly applied,
however. See, e.g., Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 591
F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979).
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the plaintiff demonstrating the defendants' class-directed bias, the Fourth Cir-
cuit did not impose such a burden on the plaintiff in Ward. The circuit court
declared that the plaintiff's allegations stated a discriminatory motive sufficient
to support a claim under section 1985(3). 178
 The Ward Court, however, did not
designate which allegations in the complaint supported its conclusion.'" This
silence is puzzling in that an examination of the relationship among the parties,
class, and injury alleged in the Ward complaint does not reveal clear factual
allegations of discriminatory bias as found in Grffin. Unlike the plaintiffs in
Griffin, the plaintiff in Ward did not allege racial discrimination.' 80 Therefore,
the assumption of class-directed bias present in Griffin was absent in Ward. In
addition, Ward centered on a family's attempt to deprogram a relative who had
probably undergone drastic personality changes upon his entry into a religious
group. 1 e' Thus, the randomness of the conspiratorial assault in Griffin was lack-
ing in Ward. Furthermore, unlike the harm alleged in Grn, the injuries in-
curred in Ward were not directed at the plaintiff as punishment for his member-
ship in a class,'" but rather were intended to force the plaintiff to give up his
membership therein. 183 These clear differences in the relationships between the
parties and injuries in Griffin and those in Ward led the district court in Ward to
conclude that, absent more factual allegations that the defendants were
motivated by hatred for Unification Church members per se, class bias could
not be presumed.' 84
The Fourth Circuit in Ward, however, rejected the district court's reason-
ing that because the plaintiff was not a victim of either racial bias, or a
systematic pattern of discrimination, a stronger showing of class bias must be
made in the allegations.'" The appeals court relied heavily on the single factor
of the presence of a protected class in the alleged conspiracy. The court rea-
soned that the allegation of an intent to force a family member to change his
religious affiliation supported an inference of discriminatory bias against
members of the Unification Church as a class. The court found the defendants'
178 657 F.2d at 49.
"9 Id.
180 Id. at 47. The factual distinctions between Griffin and Ward, i.e., racial violence ver-
sus religious deprogramming, are significant to both the class component of the Griffin gloss and
to the bias component. The circuit court in Ward noted the significance of its decision to extend
the class coverage of S 1985(3) to religious groups in light of Gnffin, and it carefully reviewed Grif-
fin' s language and subsequent treatment of the issue. Id. at 47-48. The appeals court, however,
did not consider the significance of its extension with regard to the bias component. Id. at 49.
Rather, the circuit court in Ward granted the cause of action without expressly considering
whether the presumptions about class bias motivation which were valid in Griffin were also valid
with regard to the facts alleged in Ward.
Lai Id. at 46-47. Although not mentioned in the complaint, membership in religious
groups such as the Unification Church is usually coupled with an alteration or "conversion" in
the new devotee's personality. See Delgado, supra note 9, at 21-25, and LeMoult, supra note 9, at
601-02.
192 403 U.S. at 103.
193 Brief for Respondent at 9a, Mandelkorn v. Ward, 50 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Jan. 18,
1982). See text and note at note 12 supra.
7 B4 495 F. Supp. at 438.




behavior analogous to racially motivated discrimination.'" The court implicit-
ly recognized, however, that a conspiracy aimed at the plaintiff as an in-
dividual would not satisfy section 1985(3). 187 Thus, a conspiracy motivated by
the defendants' distaste for the plaintiff's religious choice would not alone con-
stitute the type of class-based discrimination necessary to support a cause of ac-
tion under the section.'" Such a conspiracy would be evidence only of bias
against the plaintiff individually, not against the plaintiff's class as a whole.
Nonetheless, the appeals court concluded that, in the case before it, the plain-
tiff had sufficiently alleged animosity towards Unification Church members as
a class to satisfy Griffin's bias component.' 89
Significantly, the Fourth Circuit in Ward identified no allegation of fact
supporting the plaintiff's conclusory allegation of class bias ,'°° nor did the court
require the allegation of further facts pointing to at least some intention on the
defendants' part to affect Unification Church members generally, or to deprive
them of their rights as a class.'" Thus, the Fourth Circuit's treatment of Grif-
fin's bias component is apparently based on a conclusion that from the presence
of a class protected by the section, a bias against that class may be presumed.
Under this construction of the Griffin gloss, the presence of a protected class
will itself establish a presumption of bias against that class. Hence, for motions
to dismiss, the sole focus of the court's inquiry will be on the presence of a class
deemed to be protected by section 1985(3).
The Ward court's presumption of class bias from broadly pleaded facts can
be seen as an application of the general principle that in civil rights actions,
pleadings should be liberally construed. 19" Despite this general pleading rule,
however, a plaintiff claiming under section 1985(3) must still allege facts which
tend to raise a question of class bias.'" In Ward, both the trial and appellate
courts recognized that allegations which demonstrate only a bias against the
plaintiff as an individual are not sufficient to support an inference of bias
against the class. 194 The absence of further allegations of fact tending to show a
discriminatory class bias, such as the presence of an on-going conspiracy to
deprogram Unification Church members generally, compelled the district
court to conclude that the plaintiff's complaint was not sufficient to state a
'a° Id.
'a' Id. The appeals court declared that the inference of bias against a class was estab-
lished because the "complaint sufficiently charges that the defendants were motivated to act as
they did not only because they found the plaintiff's religious beliefs intolerable, but also because




"a Id. The circuit court did not mention the "systematic pattern" test employed by the
court below in finding no class bias to be present.
Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267, 1274 (N.D. Cal. 1973), citing Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
"3 See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 103. By its survey of the plaintiff's allega-
tions of fact in support of the central allegation of class animus, the Grin Court's analysis man-
dates the presence of factual pleadings from which bias may be inferred. Id. See text and notes at
notes 160-66 supra.
14 See 495 F. Supp. 438. See also text and notes at notes 180-81 supra.
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cause of action under section 1985(3). 195 The Fourth Circuit disagreed with this
result, and by its language necessarily concluded that where the plaintiff is a
member of a protected class, the mere allegation of bias against the class sup-
ports an inference of class motivation.' 96 Indeed, the circuit court held that
even in the presence of strong evidence that the defendants' tortious conduct
was motivated against the plaintiff individually,'" the mere allegation of
animosity towards a protected class generally may suffice to support a cause of
action under section 1985(3). 198
This determination by the Fourth Circuit signals a relaxation of the bias
requirement imposed by the Supreme Court in Griffin. Griffin's invidious class-
based animus gloss was the Court's interpretation of the language in section
1985(3) referring to denials of equal protection. By construing that language to
require class-based animus, the Court gave content to the apparent congres-
sional intent to reach private discriminators, while avoiding potential
federalism problems posed by the statute. Thus, the gloss was intended by the
Court to mean only that when class hatred does motivate a private conspiracy,
the intent to deprive equal protection of the laws of the United States will be
presumed.' 99 The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Ward extends this presumption
to the extent that the mere existence of a protected class will imply the presence
of a class-directed bias, sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, despite the
absence of any allegation of on-going or systematic discrimination. 200
That tortious conduct against a member of a religious group may have the
invidiously discriminatory character required by Griffin for actions under sec-
tion 1985(3) is clear. 20 ' Where the relationship between the parties and the
challenged conduct suggests personal motivation, however, class bias should
not be presumed merely because the plaintiff alleges his membership in a
religious group or other protected class. Although allegations of a systematic
pattern of discrimination have not been uniformly required by lower federal
courts to support an inference of class bias, 202 such a requirement seems par-
ticularly warranted in cases like Ward.
In Ward, the cutting edge between the case's characterization as a civil
rights violation or as an intra-family tort was the nature of the bias motivating
the defendants. Hence, the allegation of facts tending to demonstrate class as
opposed to personal bias against the plaintiff was crucial. The requirement of
specific allegations demonstrating class bias, and thus establishing a civil rights
violation, was especially important in the Ward situation in light of the
195 495 F. Supp. at 438.
196 657 F.2d at 49. The language in the complaint which the court apparently deemed
sufficient to raise a class bias question states: "The conspiracy was the result of defendants' class
based animus towards the Church and its members, and because plaintiff was a member of that
class of persons who belongs to the Church." Brief for Respondent at 8a-9a, Mandelkorn v.
Ward, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982).
197
 657 F.2d at 49.
'" Id.
199 403 U.S. at 102.
200 657 F.2d at 49. The extension of the presumption is the necessary result of the ap-
peals court's recognition of the plaintiff's suit as satisfying Gnffin's gloss without requiring factual
allegations demonstrating class bias. Id. See text at notes 190-91 supra.
761 See, e.g., Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 491 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See note 134 supra.
2" See note 177 supra.
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Supreme Court's long recognition of state law preeminence in matters con-
cerning domestic relations."' If Ward was essentially an intra-family dispute,
then the application of section 1985(3), which was designed to proscribe con-
spiracies to deprive equal protection of the laws motivated by "invidiously dis-
criminatory class-based animus," was misconceived. The allegations in the
Ward complaint claimed that it was the plaintiff's own family members who
conspired to deprogram him.'" There were no factual allegations tending to
show that the conspiracy was against Unification Church members generally,
or that other members of the church were menaced."' Nor was there any alle-
gation that the conspiracy was fomented by a deprograming organization.'"
Rather, the complaint specifically claimed that the conspiracy was contrived
and executed under the guidance of the plaintiff's family."' Thus, Griffin's re-
203 See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) ("The regulation of domestic relations
is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States. Cases de-
cided by this Court over a period of more than a century bear witness to this historical fact," id.
at 404); in re Burrus, 136 U.S. (1890) ("The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States," id. at 593-94).
"4 Brief for Respondent at 8a-9a, Mandelkorn v. Ward, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982).
9°' Id. at 9a-20a. Indeed, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant family members had at-
tempted unsuccessfully to deprogram him on a previous occasion, and would undoubtedly try
again. Id. at 9a. The plaintiff thereafter alleged facts which only demonstrated the defendants' in-
tent to deprogram him alone. Id. at 9a-20a. The conclusion that the conspiracy was directed at
the plaintiff as an individual is buttressed by the form of relief sought by the plaintiff under the
§ 1985(3) claim. Along with money damages in the amount of $15 million sought from the non-
family defendants jointly, the complaint proved for injunctive relief from the efforts of the plain-
tiffs family to deprogram him. Id. at 20a-21a. That such specific relief was sought to restrain the
actions of the defendants solely against the plaintiff reinforces the conclusion that the tortious
conduct alleged was directed solely at the plaintiff as an individual, and was not aimed at depriv-
ing Unification Church members as a class of their equal rights.
206 Id. at 9a-20a.
2" Id. at 9a-10a. Thus, Ward is distinguishable from the two most salient cases relied
upon by the appeals court in extending 1985(3)'s protection to Unification Church members.
See Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70 (D. Ariz. 1978), rev 'd on other grounds, 633 F.2d 844 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981), and Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal.
1978). In Baer, the district court declared that the presence of the Freedom of Thought Founda-
tion, an organization dedicated to deprogramming "members of particular religious groups
whose views the Foundation finds repugnant," in a conspiracy which also included the plaintiff's
family, was sufficient to raise an inference of class bias to support a cause of action under
5 1985(3). 450 F. Supp. at 491. "A fair and reasonable reading of the complaint demonstrates
that the Foundation singled out the plaintiff because of his status as a member of such a group."
Id. (emphasis added). In Rankin, members of the Foundation were also present in the conspiracy
with family members. 457 F. Supp. at 74. The district court in Rankin agreed with the Baer court
that from the overriding intent of the Foundation to abridge the rights of members of fringe
religious groups generally, the class bias required for a 5 1985(3) cause of action can be inferred.
Id. See also Cooper v. Molko, 572 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Cal. 1978). In Cooper, which was not cited
by either court in Ward, the plaintiff was a member of the Unification Church who sued his
parents and seven "deprogrammers" under facts otherwise similar to Ward. Id. at 565. Given
these allegations, the court in Cooper held that an inference of class bias was warranted and denied
the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 570. All three of these cases are clearly distinguishable
from Ward in that each relied on the presence of "deprogrammers" to establish the presence of
invidious class bias, and not on the mere conjectural ground that the plaintiff's family might
dislike the Unification Church.
Of the cases recognized by the two courts treating Ward, therefore, the case most closely
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quirement of a valid inference of class bias, supported by factual allegations
present in a plaintiff's complaint, was transformed in Ward to a presumption of
bias, raised by a plaintiff's conclusory allegation of its presence.
Had the Ward court required the plaintiff to allege facts showing that he
was a victim of systematic discrimination, the requirement of an invidiously
discriminatory class-based animus would have been satisfied. Allegations that
the plaintiffs harbored long-standing feelings of hatred towards minority
religious groups, or that they were involved in a conspiracy to deprogram
Unification Church members generally would thus support an inference of
class-directed bias under the systematic pattern of discrimination test. Even
allegations that the non-family defendants might have been involved in general
discriminatory activity against such religious groups could be seen to support
an inference of bias. The appeals court in Ward, however, did not deem such a
test to be necessary, but instead held that notwithstanding the defendants' ap-
parent good intentions, the mere possibility that class bias could have been
present — a possibility apparently established by the plaintiff's membership in
the Unification Church — satisfies Grn's bias requirement.'" Indeed, as it
was treated by the court in Ward, the bias aspect of Griffin's gloss is purely a
question of fact to be presumed satisfied at the pleadings stage and apparently
preserved solely for a fact-finder's determination.
In summary, the Fourth Circuit in Ward, after concluding that religious
groups qualify as a protected class, did not engage in a second inquiry to deter-
mine whether the factual allegations in the complaint adequately alleged
discrimination against a class. Instead, the court apparently deemed the class-
directed motive to be presumed, and allowed the plaintiff's claim to survive a
motion to dismiss on conclusory allegations. The circuit court's determination
that an inference of class bias may be presumed because of the presence of a
protected class, however, is not warranted in light of Griffin's requirement of an
invidiously discriminatory class-based animus, nor does it comport with Grif-
fin's efforts to avoid the federalization of state tort law.'" The Ward court
similar in facts is Van Styn v. Van Styn, No. 79-C-3468 (N.D. III. Feb. 7, 1980). In Van Son,
which was cited by the district court in Ward but ignored by the appeals court, a district court
dismissed a claim under S 1985(3) in which the plaintiff, a member of the International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, alleged only that her family conspired to abduct and deprogram her.
Id. The issue presented in Son was whether an inference of the requisite animus could be made
out in the acts of the defendants, the plaintiff's family. Id. There was no allegation that any of the
defendants in Van Styn were members of a deprogramming organization. The Van Styn court held
that because the "defendants were motivated, not by their dislike of a particular religious group,
but by concern for the well-being of a family member ... a discriminatory motive is lacking, and
there is no cognizable claim under [S] 1985(3)." Id. The court therefore granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss. Id. But see Augenti v. Cappellini, 84 F.R.D. 73 (M.D. Pa. 1979). Augenti,
which was not cited by either court treating Ward, involved the deprogramming of a Unification
Church member by the plaintiff's parents and others. Id. at 76. There were no allegations that
the parents' co-conspirators were members of a deprogramming organization, and in all other
relevant respects Augenti was closely similar to Ward. Id. The defendants contended that the
record lacked any factual allegations establishing class-directed bias, and moved for summary
judgment. Id. at 78. The district court held that motivation is a factual issue and therefore was
not ripe for disposition by summary judgment. Id. The district court therefore denied the defend-
ants' motion. Id.
209 657 F.2d at 49. See text and notes at notes 185-92 supra.
209 See text and notes at notes 110-112 supra.
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should have required the allegation of some facts demonstrating that the plain-
tiff was singled out by the defendants for the tortious conduct alleged because
of his class, and not simply because of his individual position as a relative of the
defendants.
CONCLUSION
Section 1985(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides a cause of action
for individuals who are the victims of purely private conspiracies to deprive
equal protection of the laws of the United States. In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the
Supreme Court outlined a two-part test for actions under section 1985(3).
First, the discriminatory act being challenged must be one which Congress has
the constitutional authority to regulate. Second, to avoid federalizing state tort
law claims, the conspiracy must be motivated by an invidiously discriminatory
class-based animus in order to constitute an attempt to deprive equal protec-
tion of the laws.
In Ward v. Connor, the Fourth Circuit held that Congress' authority to
reach certain private acts of discrimination rested in part on the constitutional-
ly protected right to interstate travel. Consequently, where, as in Ward, the
plaintiff alleged that his interstate travel was interrupted, Congress possessed
the authority to redress such an injury even if it occurred contemporaneously
with other private discriminatory acts not subject to proscription by the federal
government.
The Ward court held that religious groups constitute a protected class
within the scope of section 1985(3). The court based its conclusion on the
characteristics religious classes share with other minorities accorded special
protection under the equal protection clause. Turning to the question of
whether a class-based bias existed in the case before it, however, the court
departed from Griffin's interpretation of section 1985(3). Holding that con-
clusory allegations of discriminatory bias may survive a motion to dismiss, the
court appeared to designate the issue as one to be resolved by the trier of fact.
The Ward court seemed to indicate that the mere existence of a class protected
under section 1985(3) raises a presumption of an invidiously discriminatory
class-based animus sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. This result does
not accord with either the legislative history of section 1985(3) or the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the statute in Griffin. It is only by requiring specific
factual allegations to support the plaintiff's contention that the conspiracy is
motivated by a class-directed bias that section 1985(3) can be restricted to those
cases to which its framers intended it to be applied.
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